

Traveling between Worlds

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Oceans Apart?

Paradigms in German-American History and Historiography

Two Worlds

In the controversy over the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003, tensions between the United States and Europe in general and Germany in particular reached a level unprecedented in the postwar era. The perception of the threat that Iraq might pose to the world was very different on the two sides of the Atlantic, and Europeans grew more critical of U.S. global leadership. In his study on European-American relations, Robert Kagan exclaims that “Americans are from Mars—Europeans from Venus.”¹ He sees the dispute over the invasion of Iraq as the result of two very different worldviews: an Anglo-American outlook inspired by Hobbes and a German or European one inspired by Kant.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the common threat that once held Western Europe and the United States together disappeared. Ever since then, the United States has become more and more concerned—both diplomatically and economically—with countries outside of Europe. Germany features less prominently in the mind of American politicians, and Germans increasingly express an unambiguous preference for Europe over the United States.²

In terms of social and cultural developments as well, the Old World and the New have grown apart. Since the late 1980s, population has increased much more quickly in the United States than anywhere else in the Western world. The fertility rate has been on the rise, and today it is almost twice as high in the United States as in Germany. In addition, Americans have become increasingly religious in recent years. While churches

remain empty in today's Europe and Germany, 41 percent of all Americans attended church services regularly in 2003, and religious fundamentalism continues to win new adherents.

Furthermore, the ethnic composition of society is changing quite rapidly in the United States. Americans continue to claim German origins more than any other ethnic ancestry, and the European share of the American population is still predominant, although it is shrinking. The number of Hispanics and Asians immigrating to the United States has long exceeded the number of Europeans. If ethnicity is an indicator, North America, South America, and Asia are growing together, while Europe and North America are drifting apart.³

These social differences are compounded by historical experience, particularly over the past century. The course of U.S. history has been characterized by continuity and a steady rise to world power (or dominance). European history, in contrast, has been marked by repeated ruptures. Germany alone has seen the collapse of five different regimes in less than a century. Furthermore, while U.S. patriotism has reached an unprecedented level in recent years, Germans have an uneasy relationship with their nation. They and their European neighbors are often irritated by Americans' nationalist pride and unshakeable belief in their country.⁴

Transatlantic Ties and Late Cultural Transfer

Even though the political, social, and cultural divisions and the "intellectual dissonances" between Germany and the United States have often been deep,⁵ historians have primarily been concerned with the close ties between the two countries.⁶ This is particularly true of the post-World War II period. Today we know more, and in greater detail, about the complex relationship between Germany and the United States in this period than about the relationship between the United States and any other country.⁷ To be sure, the United States had a profound influence on West Germany after 1945. It not only constructed and defined the framework of West German security and economic welfare but also exercised a more subtle but equally far-reaching influence over West German society and culture. After 1945, media, science, art, and architecture were increasingly inspired by the United States, and the introduction of American mass culture and consumerism had a major impact on everyday life in West Germany.⁸

It has been argued that cultural transfer cannot be a one-way con-

nection, that it is mutual and intercultural, and that it always affects both sides involved.⁹ Nevertheless, in the case of postwar West Germany and the United States, the German influence on American culture seems insignificant in comparison to the influence of the United States on Germany. Many of the discussions in recent decades about Germany's future—whether they have emphasized the military or economic well-being, city planning, or the restructuring of universities—are debates about “American models.” Germans have often embraced and, perhaps more often, rejected those models, but they have rarely ignored the “American option.” The United States, in other words, is very much on the Germans' mental map.

In their worldviews, Germans and Americans may have grown apart since the height of the Cold War, but their lifestyles have grown closer. The economies of the two countries are inextricably connected, and a dense network of institutional ties exists between them. Interestingly, when the ideological gap between Germany and the United States widened, the transatlantic dialogue on culture and politics intensified almost immediately. During the Cold War, a “natural partnership” seemed to exist between Germany and America; in more recent years it has become clear to analysts on both sides of the Atlantic that such a relationship is never natural and must be continuously constructed and reconstructed, negotiated and promoted, if it is to remain vital.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Atlantic was still a geographic obstacle to frequent cross-continental encounters and a barrier to communication. Radio, television, airplanes, and the Internet had not yet come into existence. A round-trip voyage across the ocean by passenger ship took several weeks. Only a few of the more prominent German scholars and none of the leading German politicians or members of the ruling nobility visited the United States in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.¹⁰ German foreign policy focused almost exclusively on matters that arose within Europe, and America's concern with Old World politics—with the exception perhaps of the Cuba controversy and the resulting war with Spain—was incidental as well.

By most measures, the United States was still isolated in 1900. German-American political relations were of little relevance for the course of world history.¹¹ But German-American encounters were nonetheless extensive throughout the nineteenth century. The very fact alone

that 5.5 million Germans immigrated to the United States in the century before World War I had an enormous impact on U.S. society.¹² If German society began to experience increasing Americanization after World War I, the preceding century saw equally strong German influence on American institutions and communities.¹³ Transatlantic travel and direct contacts were infrequent, but the cultural and intellectual exchange between Germans and Americans was nevertheless intense. For most of the nineteenth century, the immigrant subculture of German Americans was more diverse and visible than that of any other group in the United States.¹⁴ Germans were concerned about slavery, outspoken in labor conflicts, active in religious communities, dedicated to education and school reform, and notoriously involved in the *Wirtshaus* (tavern) business.¹⁵ In “frontier cities” such as Milwaukee and Ann Arbor, German Americans, especially women, were often the first group to establish insurance and pension programs, banks, schools, hospitals, churches and synagogues, charities, and theaters.¹⁶ Moreover, they were involved in architecture, engineering, and the design of an urban infrastructure and were often responsible for the introduction of new methods in agriculture and forestry.¹⁷

“Intercultural transfer” from Germany to the United States was thus a multilayered and far-reaching process in nineteenth-century America. German institutions and ideas served continuously as models. Often those who adopted them were not aware of the transfer or its dynamics. In some cases, German-American agents of intercultural transfer played a significant role in promoting a collective German-American identity. German Americans such as General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, Johann Jakob Astor, August Roebing, and Carl Schurz, as well as prominent German visitors to the United States such as Alexander von Humboldt, were celebrated as “cultural heroes.”¹⁸

In the absence of common religious and social roots, German-American ethnic festivals—*Sängerfeste* (songfests), *Turnfeste* (gymnastic events), and *Volksfeste* (folk festivals)—played an important role in the construction of a collective identity and ethnicity. In the course of World War I, however, when Germany and America faced each other as enemies, this distinctive culture disappeared almost entirely, and German immigration to the United States was never again to reach its pre-World War I level.¹⁹ This caesura is reflected in the studies collected here, all of which deal with the period before World War I.

American Perceptions of Germany and German-American Encounters

For decades, historians have written about the German perception of America, but little research has been done on the American perception of Germany, the focal point of this book.²⁰ A number of issues account for this historiographical imbalance, which is related in part to the constellation of political circumstances and ideologies that prevailed after World War II. The U.S. military presence in Europe and the Americanization of German institutions triggered scholarly research on the origins and precedents of U.S. influence in Germany. Historians began to explore topics such as the *Amerikabild* (image of America) of the German revolution of 1848.²¹ Another reason for the strong focus on German perceptions of the United States was the weight of sheer numbers. After all, many more Germans traveled to the United States than Americans to Germany during the nineteenth century, and they produced a rich body of materials—ranging from scholarly investigations to advice books for immigrants—that scholars have examined in detail.²²

The chapters in this volume go beyond the analysis of cultural stereotypes. Most of them deal with individual travelers and their role as transatlantic intermediaries. In his study of American views of the kingdom of Saxony in the nineteenth century, Eberhard Brüning discusses the journeys of notable American scholars and writers for whom Saxony, particularly its capital, Dresden, was a favorite destination. The travels that Brüning describes are the cultural pilgrimages of an American elite. These travelers took their extended transatlantic journeys before the age of mass travel, but their observations touch upon the concerns of modern tourism as well. Practical hints about the prices of hotels, for instance, are as much a part of their writings as their comments about outstanding tourist sites and destinations. The scholars who set sail for the old continent were surely interested in university life and academic contacts, but they also came to Germany as for pleasure.²³ The American scholars' observations had great influence because they were often published in the form of travel books or guidebooks. This genre was intended, as Brüning points out, "to satisfy the curiosity" of potential travelers and "to provide them with all sorts of valuable information on where to go and what to see."²⁴ Clearly, the writings of nineteenth-century American travelers were among the most popular sources of

information on Germany, and they provide a highly romanticized view of the Old World.

Many nineteenth-century Germans traveled to the United States in order to encounter “the other”: everything that their country was not.²⁵ The same is true for Americans who went to Germany. For Germans, “the other” consisted of phenomena such as American democracy, the diverse ethnic composition of American society, and the “untouched” landscapes of the West. For those Americans who went to Germany, on the other hand, “the other” might be found in royal courts with their ancient ceremonies and regal splendor, as in Brüning’s example of Saxony; in the old libraries and theaters; and in the picturesque landscapes such as “Saxon Switzerland.” The focus on (and in some cases the obsession with) symbols, sites, and ceremonies of bygone times was rooted in what one might call the voyeurism of the New World. Because aristocracy had no place in the United States, getting a glimpse of its splendor was intriguing to American visitors. The old continent and the new were separated in time as well as in space. If Germany symbolized the aristocratic past as it preserved the cultural traditions of old, America represented the “land of the future” for Germans.²⁶

In their travel writings, Americans constructed mental maps that gave special meaning to a few selected sites, while many places remained unnoticed. In this cultural construction, Dresden embodied the tradition of a provincial court and capital, Leipzig was the city of international fairs, Weimar symbolized the tradition of classical literature, Göttingen represented the German university tradition, and so on. Germany, in other words, was not a unified scene in the eyes of Americans; instead—and this is one of the insights that Brüning’s chapter offers—regional sites and the meaning that was attributed to them figured prominently in nineteenth-century American perceptions of Germany.

In his chapter on John Lothrop Motley, John T. Walker takes a close look at the role that one prominent scholar and diplomat played as a transatlantic actor and “interpreter of German culture” in the early nineteenth century. Motley’s case is interesting for a number of reasons. First, he chose to travel to Germany and to learn the German language at a time when very few colleges in the United States offered German as a foreign language. Furthermore, he championed Goethe in a New England that was hostile toward the German writer’s seemingly atheistic *Weltanschauung*.²⁷ Later on, Motley engaged in a transatlantic dialogue with

Otto von Bismarck, whom he had met as a university student in Göttingen in the 1830s.

By the mid-nineteenth century, only about two hundred American students had spent time at German universities.²⁸ Nonetheless, their influence in establishing cultural ties to Germany through their writings and the institutions they led can hardly be overstated.²⁹ The establishment of Round Hill School in Northampton, Massachusetts, by two Americans who were inspired by German school models—Joseph Green Cogswell and George Bancroft—was one of the early developments in cultural transfer and transnational institution building. Motley, who had attended Roundhill School, was moved to study in Göttingen by the examples of Cogswell and Bancroft, and he became one of the American promoters of contemporary German literature and philosophy in the early nineteenth century. Walker calls Motley a “transatlantic man” not only because he spent more than half of his life in Europe but also because the idea of “America as a product of European historical development” was at the core of Motley’s worldview. For Motley, freedom was a transatlantic concept, and he used a progressive model to describe the evolution and dissemination of the idea of freedom; he believed that the origins of freedom could be found in Germany; he emphasized that the Anglo Saxons had spread the idea of freedom across the Atlantic; and he expected their example to play a role in Germany’s future as “Prussian despotism” eventually gave way to the spreading of liberties.³⁰ What is remarkable about Motley’s view of Germany is his optimism and his belief in the existence of a German-American community of values.

In a study of public institutions and urban communities in a “transatlantic world,” Thomas Adam goes one step further. His interest lies in both the intellectual exchange and the actual transfer of ideas and organizational concepts across the Atlantic. Adam’s study focuses on the establishment of two urban cultural projects, the Boston Public Library and the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. Both institutions would not have been founded without the engagement of two American scholars who had studied in Göttingen and Berlin, George Ticknor and George Fisk Comfort. Adam argues that Ticknor and Comfort formed the new American institutions according to European blueprints: The Boston Public Library was modeled after the Royal Saxon Library in Dresden, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art followed the example of

German art museums founded on the initiative of middle-class civic associations.

In the case of the Boston Public Library, George Ticknor insisted on the introduction of a system of free book circulation to replace the older model of reference libraries that granted only restricted access to users. With regard to the Metropolitan Museum of Art, George Comfort borrowed the German model of using a private association as the organizational basis for establishing an art museum. These two institutions served in turn as models for subsequent projects in the United States. Furthermore, some of the ideas that evolved in the transatlantic process of adaptation—such as museum associations and popular education for social betterment (in the case of the Boston Library)—would later be “reimported” to Germany. Adam’s contribution to this volume makes clear that the “transatlantic community” was constantly negotiated and renegotiated in a process of “cultural borrowing”: The United States imitated and adapted European models, and Europe responded in kind.

Gabriele Lingelbach is more critical of the concept of transatlantic transfer than Brüning, Walker, and Adam. Her chapter focuses more on the transfer of structures from Germany to the United States and less on the role of individual actors and their ideas. In her sophisticated assessment of the institutional development of universities in Germany and the United States, Lingelbach rejects the traditional view that American college reform in the nineteenth century was heavily influenced by the German university model.³¹ She not only questions the very existence of a unified “German model” but also convincingly demonstrates that cultural transfer was generally selective. Only individual elements of the German university system were imported, and many of them were adapted or “reinvented” to fit the American system. Lingelbach reminds us that any transfer “across cultural borders” is a complex process that cannot be described in simple terms.³²

One of the complicating factors in the analysis of cultural transfer from Germany to the United States is the fact that the receiving society itself was very diverse. “American culture” was in reality a mix of multiple subcultures. In their contributions to this volume, Andrew P. Yox and Christiane Harzig focus on the German-American subculture. Their chapters are less concerned with the import of ideas, concepts, or institutions and more with the German migration experience itself. Yox uses German-American poetry as a source for understanding “the German-American mindset.”³³

German-American poetry has not been a topic of serious historical study.³⁴ Yox deserves special credit, therefore, for the “rediscovery” of this body of primary sources. In his chapter, he argues that “lost love” was one of the dominant themes of nineteenth-century German-American poetry. In contrast to poetry published at the same time in Germany, according to Yox, German-American poems showed almost no awareness of erotic love. In general, German-American poetry was descriptive rather than reflective or self-referential. It was less concerned with literary and philosophical traditions than its counterpart in Germany. “The heroes of the German poets” were, as Yox puts it, “scholars—such as Socrates, Plato, and Shelley—whereas those of the German-American poets” were “political and religious leaders.”

German-American poetry displayed a set of emotions that was closely connected to the loss of enduring ties to Germany. It can thus help us reconstruct aspects of German-American identity. But we know very little about the social place of *belles lettres* in the German-American community; the production, distribution, and reception of this literature; and the authors and the way they saw themselves. Accordingly, much more research needs to be done.

In her contribution to this volume, Christiane Harzig argues that German-speaking immigrants in North America were much more subtly connected to Europe and Germany than most of the existing literature assumes. While earlier generations of scholars focused on socioeconomic or structural elements—such as the push-pull paradigm of migration—to describe the interaction between immigrants and their home country, Harzig demonstrates that the interconnection between German Americans and Germans affected virtually every aspect of life. She points out that, in Germany, there was great familiarity with the United States—and vice versa—even though the connection between the two continents was often based on imagination. The permanence and the intensity of this exchange, which took place in a number of different spheres (political, economic, institutional, and discursive), result in the construction of what Harzig calls “transatlantic space.” Ultimately, she suggests, we should conceive of transcultural encounters “as taking place, not so much in two separate worlds,” but as exchanges within a space that is characterized by “similarities and familiarities,” by “subtle translations and adaptations.”³⁵

Some of the findings presented in this collection seem incompatible, at least at first glance. For Lingelbach and Yox, Germany and the United

States are separate worlds, oceans apart. The structures of German universities were never actually “transplanted” to America (Lingelbach), and German-American poets expressed sentiments of “uprootedness,” not of an intimate connection with the homeland (Yox). For the other authors, the German and American worlds are much more closely connected through intellectual exchange (Brüning), shared traditions and values (Walker), the “borrowing” of institutional concepts (Adam), and the transcultural nature of everyday experience (Harzig). Nevertheless, taken together, the studies in this collection provide us with a picture of a transatlantic world that was based on the continuous exchange of ideas.

Even the chapters that emphasize close transatlantic ties make it very clear that each and every idea was *transformed* in the process of intercultural transfer. Nothing crossed the Atlantic without adaptation and change. Literary and personal encounters were common, but there were also barriers such as language and cultural prejudice. At the same time, the authors who claim that the ocean was a major impediment in the transplantation of institutions emphasize that transatlantic models shaped American discourse and structures. A variety of obstacles stood in the way of cultural transfer. It was easier, for instance, to create a *new* type of institution in America—like a public library or an art association—than to radically reform or restructure a larger *existing* body—such as the college or university system. In both cases, however, transatlantic models were central points of reference. The same is true for German-American poetry. The difference between works written by Germans and those penned by German Americans was unmistakable, but German Americans constantly referred to the Old World and its traditions.

With their focus on exchange, all of the chapters in this collection are written in the tradition of what Erich Angermann has called “Atlantic history,” a conceptual approach that views “American history as part of an integrated history of North America and Europe.”³⁶ All of them assume that the Atlantic was a sphere shared by both the Old World and the New. Rather than emphasizing the difference in developments on either side of the Atlantic—the German “Sonderweg” and American “exceptionalism”—the contributors to this collection suggest that the reference to concepts and ideas, if not the actual transfer, was vital throughout the nineteenth century.

It should not surprise us that cultural and social questions are at the

core of a collection that deals with German-American encounters before World War I. Whereas earlier generations of Atlantic historians were concerned mostly with the diplomatic, political, and economic ties between Europe and America, these chapters reconstruct the reciprocal images of Germany and America. They reveal prejudices, visions, and literary stereotypes; they discuss actual and virtual travel across the Atlantic; and they explain the role of individuals in the various processes of cultural and institutional transfer. All of these studies rest on the understanding of the fact that in the nineteenth century—much more so than in the twentieth or the present—it was not the major political or corporate players in Germany and the United States who set the tone of German-American relations but the educators and philanthropists, writers and scientists, and, above all, immigrants: ordinary women and men.

NOTES

1. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Knopf, 2003); cf. also Kenneth W. Stein, “Americans Are from Mars—Europeans from Venus,” in *Orlando Sentinel*, Apr. 21, 2003.

2. Cf. *Transatlantic Trends 2003: A Project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo* (Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2003), 3.

3. Cf. Thomas Frankenfeld and Cornel Faltin, “Am Glauben scheiden sich die Kontinente,” *Hamburger Abendblatt*, Dec. 30, 2003. Frankenfeld and Faltin also report that 95 percent of all Americans believe in God, and nine out of 10 U.S. citizens pray on a regular basis. Hartmut Lehmann, who has analyzed religion in a comparative transatlantic perspective and over a longer period of time, has argued that American society experienced a re-Christianization while secularization progressed in European societies. However, he also points out that there are many contradictory elements that need to be studied further. Cf. Hartmut Lehmann, “The Role of Religion in Germany and America in the 19th and 20th centuries,” in *Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective*, edited by Elisabeth Glaser and Hermann Wellenreuther (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69–81.

4. According to a new survey of American values by the Pew Research Center, 91 percent of Americans say they are very patriotic. Cf. “A Survey of America,” in *Economist* (Nov. 8, 2003): 14.

5. This term is used by Konrad Jarausch in an excellent article about German-American misperceptions during the 1990s. Konrad H. Jarausch, “Intellektuelle Dissonanzen: Deutsch-amerikanische (Miss-)Verständnisse in den neunziger Jahren,” in *Deutsch-amerikanische Begegnungen: Konflikt und Kooperation im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, edited by Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 276–92.

6. For a plea to study both the differences and commonalities, cf. Erich Angermann, *Challenges of Ambiguity: Doing Comparative History*, German Historical Institute Annual Lecture series, no. 4 (New York: Berg, 1991); Erich Angermann and Marie-Luise Frings, eds., *Oceans Apart: Comparing Germany and the United States* (Stuttgart: Clett-Cotta, 1981); Elisabeth Glaser and Hermann Wellenreuther, eds., *Bridging the Atlantic: The Question of American Exceptionalism in Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999).

7. Cf. the 146 essays on German-American relations assembled by Detlef Junker, ed., and Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris, associate eds., *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, 1945–1990: ein Handbuch*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999, German edition); published in English as *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also Axel Schäfer, “The Study of Americanization and German Unification: Institutional Transfer, Popular Culture, and the East,” in *Central European History* 12 (2003): 129–44.

8. Cf. Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marssolek, and Adelheid von Saldern, eds., *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1996); Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn: Dietz, 1998); Bernd Greiner, “Test the West: Über die ‘Amerikanisierung’ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in *Mittelweg* 36 (1997): 4–40; Volker Berghahn, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, and Christof Mauch, eds., *The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 1999).

9. Among the best theoretical studies on intercultural transfer and on the related aspects of comparative history are Jürgen Kocka and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, *Geschichte und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung* (New York: Campus, 1996); Johannes Paulmann, “Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer: zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts,” in *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998): 649–85; Deborah Cohen, “Comparative History: Buyer Beware,” in *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 29 (2001): 23–34; Michel Espagne, “Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire culturelle,” in *Genèses* 17 (1994): 102–21.

10. Among them are Alexander von Humboldt, Friedrich List, Friedrich Ratzel, and Friedrich Engels. None of the German kings or emperors visited America, and neither did Otto von Bismarck. Ernst Fraenkel points out that, in order to reconstruct Bismarck’s attitudes toward America, one has to study interviews with American visitors, such as Carl Schurz and Henry Villard. Ernst Fraenkel, *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959), 33–34.

11. Certainly nobody could have foreseen that the next century would bring about the involvement of Germans and Americans in two world wars. For a general overview of German-American relations in the twentieth century, see Klaus Larres and Torsten Oppeland, eds., *Deutschland und die USA im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen* (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997); for a comparative approach see Ragnhild Fiebig von Hase and Jürgen Heideking, eds., *Zwei Wege in die moderne Aspekte der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Trier, Germany: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1998); also Christof Mauch, "Pazifismus und politische Kultur: die organisierte Friedensbewegung in Deutschland und den USA in vergleichender Perspektive, 1900–1917," in *ibid.*, 261–92.

12. Cf. Günter Moltmann, "Charakteristische Züge der deutschen Amerika-Auswanderung im 19. Jahrhundert," in *Amerika und die Deutschen: Bestandsaufnahme einer 300 jährigen Geschichte*, edited by Frank Trommler (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1986), 40–49, 40. Cf. also Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, *Vor der grossen Flut: die europäische Einwanderung in die USA 1783–1820* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001); Dirk Hoerder and Jörg Nagler, eds., *People in Transit: German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820–1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Perhaps the most notable exception of massive earlier exchange between Germany and America was the employment of the so-called Hessians by the British during the Revolutionary War. Cf. Inge Auerbach, *Die Hessen in Amerika, 1776–1783* (Darmstadt, Germany: Hessische Historische Kommission, 1996), and, more recently, Christof Mauch, "Images of America, Political Myths, Historiography: 'Hessians' in the War of Independence" in *Amerikastudien* [American Studies] 48(3) (2003), 411–24.

13. Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) (A German translation is scheduled to appear in 2006 as part of the Transatlantische Historische Studien Series of Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart.); Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten: "Amerikanisierung" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1900–1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003); Thomas J. Saunders, *Hollywood in Berlin: American Cinema and Weimar Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Peter Berg, *Deutschland und Amerika, 1918–1929: über das deutsche Amerikabild der zwanziger Jahre* (Lübeck, Germany: Matthiesen, 1963); Manfred Berg, *Gustav Stresemann und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: weltwirtschaftliche Verflechtung und Revisionspolitik, 1907–1929* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990); Michael Wala, *Weimar und Amerika: Botschafter Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von 1927 bis 1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2001); Gesine Schwan, "Das deutsche Amerikabild seit der Weimarer Republik," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B26 (1986): 3–15; Philipp Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich: Ideologie, Propaganda, und Volksmeinung, 1933–1945* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997); Philipp Gassert, "Amerikanismus, Anti-amerikanismus, Amerikanisierung in der deutschen Gesellschaft," in *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35 (1995): 1–34.

14. Kathleen Neils Conzen, "Phantomlandschaften der Kolonisierung: die

Deutschen und die Entstehung des pluralistischen Amerika,” in *Deutsch-Amerikanische Begegnungen*, edited by Trommler and Shore, 31–45, 34.

15. Charlotte L. Brancaforte, ed., *The German Forty-Eighters in the United States* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); Christof Mauch, “Zwischen Edelmut und Roheit: Indianer und Schwarze aus deutscher Perspektive: Sichtweisen des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in *Amerikastudien* 40 (1995): 619–36. With regard to labor conflicts, cf., for instance, Hartmut Keil, ed., *German Workers’ Culture in the United States, 1850–1920* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988); Hartmut Keil and John B. Jentz, *German Workers in Industrial Chicago, 1850–1910: A Comparative Perspective* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1983). With regard to religion, see Christof Mauch and Joseph Salmons, eds., *German-Jewish Identities in America* (Madison: Max Kade Institute and the University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); Michael Hochgeschwender, “Wahrheit, Einheit, Ordnung: der US-amerikanische Katholizismus und die Sklavenfrage, 1835–1870,” *Habilitationschrift*, Universität Tübingen, 2003; Tobias Brinkmann, *Von der Gemeinde zur “Community”: jüdische Einwanderer in Chicago, 1840–1900* (Osnabrück, Germany: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 2002). With regard to school reform, see Henry Geitz, Jürgen Heideking, and Jürgen Herbst, eds., *German Influences on Education in the United States to 1917* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). With regard to the taverns, see Ulrike Skorsetz, “Der Franzose wechselt die Mode, wir Deutschen dagegen wechseln die Wirtshäuser: Wirtshäuser und Bierkonsum aus der Sicht deutscher Einwanderer im neunzehnten Jahrhundert,” in *Yearbook of German-American Studies* 31 (1996): 37–44.

16. Cf. Kathleen Neils Conzen, *Immigrant Milwaukee, 1836–1860: Accommodation and Community in a Frontier City* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Kathleen Neils Conzen, *Germans in Minnesota* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2003). On the role of women, cf. especially Anke Ortlepp: “Auf denn, Ihr Schwester!” *deutschamerikanische Frauenvereine in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1844–1914* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004); Christiane Harzig, *Familie, Arbeit, und weibliche Öffentlichkeit in einer Einwanderungsstadt: Deutschamerikanerinnen in Chicago um die Jahrhundertwende* (St. Katharinen, Germany: Scripta Mercaturae, 1991); Irene Häderle, *Deutsche kirchliche Frauenvereine in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1870–1930: eine Studie über die Bedingungen und Formen der Akkulturation deutscher Einwanderinnen und ihrer Töchter in den USA* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997); Anja Schüler, *Frauenbewegung und soziale Reform: Jane Addams und Alice Salomon im transatlantischen Dialog, 1889–1933* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004).

17. John Augustus Roebling, who constructed New York’s Brooklyn Bridge, was perhaps the most prominent German-American engineer. Another example is architect Adolf Cluss, a Forty-eighter who was born in Heilbronn and had a major influence on architecture, city planning, and environmental politics in Washington, D.C., in the post-Civil War era. With regard to forestry, cf., for instance, Charles Hallock, “What the Germans Say about Wood Cutting,” in *Forest and Stream* (Sept. 18, 1873), 89.

18. Willi Paul Adams, “Ethnische Führungsrollen und die Deutsch-

amerikaner," in Trommler, *Amerika und die Deutschen*, 165–76, 169f. On Alexander von Humboldt, cf. Andreas Daum, "The Invention of a Hero: Alexander von Humboldt in American Memory and Culture," paper presented at the Historikertag, Halle an der Saale, Germany, Sept. 12, 2002. Cf. also the report on this panel, Christof Mauch, "America in Germany, Germany in America," in *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 32 (2003): 127–30.

19. Cf. Heike Bungert, "Die Festkultur der Deutschamerikanischer im Spannungsfeld zwischen deutscher und amerikanischer Identität, 1848–1925," Habilitationsschrift, Universität zu Köln, 2004. Bungert argues that German-American festive culture did not disappear entirely after World War I, but sites of German-American memory were now located in America rather than Germany. For a variety of issues relating to festive culture in U.S. history, cf. Jürgen Heideking, Geneviève Fabre, and Kai Dreisbach, eds., *Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Berghahn, 2001). According to many scholars, the vanishing of German-American culture was already well on its way before the onset of World War I; cf., for instance, Charles Thomas Johnson, *Culture at Twilight: The National German-American Alliance, 1901–1918* (New York: Peter Lang, 1999); Jörg Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg: "Feindliche Ausländer" und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2000); Russell A. Kazal, *Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

20. Among the exceptions are Hermann Wellenreuther, "Germans Make Cows and Women Work": American Perceptions of Germans as Reported in American Travel Books, 1800–1840," in *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America since 1776*, edited by David E. Barclay and Elisabeth Glaser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 41–63; Jörg Nagler, "From Culture to Kultur: Changing American Perceptions of Imperial Germany, 1870–1914," in *Transatlantic Images*, edited by Glaser and Barclay, 131–54; Holger Kersten, "A Tramp Abroad: Mark Twain sieht Deutschland," in *Amerikanisches Deutschlandbild und deutsches Amerikabild*, edited by Frank Krampikowski (Baltmannsweiler, Germany: Pädagogischer Verlag Burgbücherei Schneider, 1990), 136–55.

21. Cf., for instance, Eckhart G. Franz, *Das Amerikabild der deutschen Revolution von 1848/1849: zum Problem der Übertragung gewachsener Verfassungsformen* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1958); Günter Moltmann, *Atlantische Blockpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert: die Vereinigten Staaten und der deutsche Liberalismus während der Revolution von 1848/1849* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1973). One of the prominent examples of U.S. institutional influences after World War II is the impact of the United States on the German *Grundgesetz* (constitutional law). Cf. Edmund Spevack, *Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and Ideological Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law* (Münster, Germany: Lit, 2001).

22. Cf., for instance, Ingrid Schöberl, *Amerikanische Einwandererwerbung in Deutschland, 1845–1914* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990); Peter Brenner, *Die*

Erfahrung Nordamerikas in deutschen Reise- und Auswandererberichten des 19. Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer, 1991); Günter Moltmann, ed., *Aufbruch nach Amerika: die Auswanderungswelle von 1816/1817* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1989); Juliane Mikoletzky, *Die deutsche Amerika-Auswanderung des 19. Jahrhunderts in der zeitgenössischen fiktionalen Literatur* (Tübingen, Germany: Niemeyer, 1988).

23. Brüning's analysis does not seem to confirm the view of Hermann Wellenreuther, who suggests that the first American scholars who visited Germany were mainly interested in German scholarship, whereas later generations came either with an interest in European (rather than German) culture or as curiosity seekers. Hermann Wellenreuther, "Germans Make Cows and Women Work," 47–48.

24. Brüning, 3.

25. This is the case with Julius Fröbel, Paul Wilhelm von Württemberg, Maximilian Prinz zu Wied, and many others. Cf. Peter Brenner, *Reisen in die Neue Welt*, 188ff.

26. Hegel had coined the term "the land of the future" in his lectures on the philosophy of history. Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Hermann Glockner, 20 vols. (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1949), vol. 11, 120.

27. Edmund Spevack, in his study on Karl Follen, Motley's professor at Harvard, points out that the image of Goethe "had been almost entirely negative in America until the 1830s." Edmund Spevack, *Charles Follen's Search for Nationality and Freedom: Germany and America, 1796–1840* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), 157.

28. Daniel Fallon, "Deutsche Einflüsse auf das amerikanische Erziehungswesen," in Trommler, *Deutsch-amerikanische Begegnungen*, 99; Charles Franklin Thwing, *The American and the German University: One Hundred Years of History* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 42.

29. One of the finest case studies is Axel Schäfer, "W. E. B. Du Bois, "German Social Thought and the Racial Divide in American Progressivism, 1892–1909," in *Journal of American History* 88 (2001): 925–49.

30. On the idea of freedom in U.S. and German history, cf. these two essays: Eric Foner, "The Idea of Freedom in American History," 25–39, and Jürgen Kocka, "The Idea of Freedom in German History," 41–47, both in *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 34 (2004).

31. Cf. John A[lbrecht] Walz, *German Influence in American Education and Culture* (Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, 1936), and Edward Shils, "Die Beziehungen zwischen deutschen und amerikanischen Universitäten," in *Deutschlands Weg in die Moderne: Politik, Gesellschaft, und Kultur im 19. Jahrhundert*, edited by Wolfgang Hartwig and Harm-Hinrich Brandt (Munich: Beck, 1993), 185–200.

32. Cf. also Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey, eds., *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Kiran Klaus Patel, "Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Historiographie," in *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29 (2003): 625–47.

33. Andrew P. Yox, "The Fate of Love," this volume, 1–2.

34. Brent O. Peterson has been one of the very few scholars who has argued that we should study German-American literature; Brent O. Peterson, “Wie—und warum—man deutsch-amerikanische Literatur lesen sollte,” in *Deutsch-Amerikanische Begegnungen*, edited by Trommler and Shore, 117–34.

35. Harzig, 43f; cf. also Dirk Hoerder, Christiane Harzig, and Adrian Shubert, eds., *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions from the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World* (New York: Berghahn, 2003).

36. Glaser and Wellenreuther, “Introduction,” in *Bridging the Atlantic*, 1; Erich Angermann, *Challenges of Ambiguity: Doing Comparative History* (New York: Berg, 1991).